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ABSTRACT
This research aimed to examine the effect of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD) and corporate governance mechanisms (CGM) on 
earnings management (EM) and stock risk (SRISK). The examination was 
conducted from the context of mandatory adoption of IAS-PSAK 50&55 
(Revised 2006) and macroprudential policy in 2010. This study used the data 
of 36 banks, with 131 bank-years samples that were listed on IDX for the 
years 2008-2013. The results concluded that: (1a) CSRD has weak negative 
effect on SRIS; (1b) CGM has partial negative effect on SRISK, whereby 
BCM has no significant effect on SRISK, while ACM has significant negative 
effect on SRISK; (2a) CSRD has significant negative effect on E; (2b) CGM 
has partially negative effect on EM, whereby BCM has no significant effect 
on EM, while ACM has significant negative effect on EM; and (3) EM has 
positive significant effect on SRISK. Results 2 and 3 leads to the conclusion 
that direct effect of CSRD on SRISK was explained by indirect effect through 
EM. The overall result showed CSRD and CGM have negative effect on EM, 
though there are no significant decrease of EM at post period mandatory 
adoption of PSAK 50 and 55, yet the evidence found significant lower SRISK 
at post period of mandatory adoption of PSAK 50&55 (Revised 2006) and 
macroprudential policy.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsibility 
disclosure, earnings management, corporate governance mechanisms, stock 
risk.
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INTrODUCTION
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined as a business’ commitment 
to contribute to sustainable economic development, through collaboration 
with stakeholders, employees, customers, local communities and the public 
to improve quality of life, in ways that benefit both its own business and 
development (Kiroyan 2006; in Istianingsih and Zulni 2013). The companies 
face increasing demand of stakeholders to achieve a balance of economic, 
environment and social imperatives in accordance to the triple bottom line; 
people, profit and planet (Elkington 1998). CSR disclosure is viewed as a 
communication tool that influences the perceptions of stakeholders, analyst 
and institutional investor, regarding future profitability, financial prospect 
and sustainability (Linblom 1993; Handajani, Sutrisno and Chandrarin, 
2009). The companies listed on Indonesia stock Exchange (IDX) have to 
disclose Csr as regulated by law, Undang Undang No. 40 tahun 2007, and 
Peraturan Pemerintah. No. 47 tahun 2012. To date, majority of public banks 
in IDX have disclosed Csr in their annual reports, while several provide 
such disclosure in the integrated reporting sustainability report based on 
the Global reporting Initiative (GrI). 
Prior researches on economics consequences of voluntary disclosure 
(Botosan 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) have motivated several studies 
regarding CSR disclosure. Several findings showed that CSR disclosure has 
a positive effect on companies’ performance, reflected through indicators 
such as abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal return, trading volume 
activity, and earnings per share (Cochran & Wood 1984; Andersen & frankie 
1980; in sayekti 2011). Csr disclosure does have an effect on earnings 
response coefficient (ERC), and it increases earnings informativeness 
(Bae and sami 2005; sayekti &Wondabio 2007; Istianingsih & Zulni 
2013). Csr disclosure is perceived as a signal of good performance and 
management accountability to gain stakeholders’ legitimacy (Gray et al. 
1996; sayekti&Wondabio 2007; sayekti 2011). 
Bebbington, Larinaga and Moneva, (2008) stated that Csr disclosure 
could be viewed as part of reputational risk management. reputation is 
conceptualised from the economic and strategic management perspective to 
sociologically-informed perspective that views reputation as the outcome of 
shared socially constructed impression of the firm (Scott and Walsham, 2005; 
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in Bebbington et al., 2008). reputation is viewed as a strategic intangible 
asset that is expected to produce tangible benefits such as lower cost of 
capital, increased loyalty of employee and customer as well as increased 
quality of decision-making process (roberts and Dowling 2002).
Hong and Andersen (2011) stated that the effect of Csr disclosure 
on risk could not be separated from the credibility of earnings information. 
francis et al. (2005) found that the company with poor accrual quality has 
higher costs of capital than those with good better accrual quality. Botoson 
(1997) found that voluntary disclosure to reduce transaction costs is reflected 
through adverse selection component of bid-ask spread. These findings 
show the evidences that there are related information risk regarding Csr 
disclosure and companies’ earnings information. Information risk is defined 
as the likelihood that firm specific information is of poor quality (Easley 
and o’Hara, 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2004 in francis et al., 2005)
Previous research studying the effect of Csr disclosure on earnings 
management found contradictory findings. CSR disclosure is found to be 
positively associated with aggressive earnings reporting, and increasing 
management opportunistic behaviour (Chih, Shen and Kang, 2008; Handajani 
et al.2009), while Hong and Andersen (2011) found negative association 
among the aforementioned variables. Bae, Doowon and Youngkyu (2013) 
found evidence that the effect of Csr on earnings management is more 
influenced by the specific context of the companies’ environment, where 
Csr disclosure is found to be positively affecting earnings management in 
high-profile industry, but negatively effecting those in low-profile industry. 
Other research findings found that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms 
(eg. board of commissioners, audit committee, ownership structure) play 
an important role on the effect of Csr disclosure to earnings management 
(Chih et al. 2008; Handajani et al. 2009; Bae et al. 2013).
This research aimed to examine the effect of Csr disclosure and CG 
mechanisms on earnings management and stock risk. The first proposed 
model hypothesised that (1) Csr disclosure and CG mechanisms have 
negative effect on stock risk directly. This research also examined whether 
Csr disclosure and CG mechanism have negative effect on stock return 
indirectly through earnings management, by examining hypothesis (2) 
Csr disclosure and CG mechanisms have negative effect on earnings 
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management, and (3) Earnings management has positive effect on stock 
risk. The CG mechanism comprised of board commissioner mechanism 
(BCM) and audit committee mechanism (ACM).
The examination was conducted from the context of mandatory 
adoption of IAs-PsAK 50&55 (revised 2006) and macroprudential policy 
in 2010. This study used pooled data of 36 banks (131 bank-years samples) 
listed on IDX for the years 2008-2013. PsAK 50&55 (revised 2006) is the 
statement of financial Accounting standard (sfAs) in Indonesia which 
regulates the measurement, recognition, and presentation of financial 
instrument. PsAK 50&55 had converged to IAs 32 and 39. Macroprudential 
policy is the approach of financial regulation aimed to mitigate systemic 
risk and maintain the stability of financial system by encouraging the 
bank and financial services companies to re-orient the business towards a 
macroprudential perspective (Ekaputri 2011).
This study was motivated by limited CSR disclosure research findings 
in the banking industry in Indonesia. Previous studies conducted were 
mostly in the non-financial industries and did not examine the effect of 
Csr disclosure on earnings management in the same context. The banking 
industries with high and specific regulation are predicted to have better CSR 
disclosure and have different effects on earnings management and stock risk, 
relative to other sectors and industries. Indonesia’s banking sector survey 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013) showed that high operational risk in 
the banking industry has attracted attention of management to focus on the 
quality of Csr disclosure to gain legitimacy of stakeholders.
The study contributes in several ways. firstly, it contributes to the 
literature of Csr disclosure research as this study examines the direct and 
indirect effects of Csr disclosure as well as CG mechanisms on stock risk. 
The indirect effect will be explained by the effect of Csr disclosure and 
CG mechanisms through mediation on earnings management, as proxy of 
information risk. secondly, this study provides input to regulators of the 
banking industry and the capital market about the regulatory effectiveness 
of Csr disclosure. Thirdly, this study provides input to investors, analysts 
and other related stakeholders for better decision-making.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 
explains the literature and hypotheses development. section 3 explains the 
design of the research; sample and data, model development, and variable 
operationalisation. Empirical result and analysis are presented in section 
4, followed by conclusions, limitation and suggestion for future research 
in section 5. 
THEOrETICAL frAMEWOrK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Stock Risk
It was argued that Csr disclosure should be a part of reputational risk 
management (Bebbington et al. 2008) as Csr disclosure conveys private 
information, signaling good performance of social responsibility to ensure 
that companies have taken desired action in accordance to social norms. The 
harmony in fullfiling the social contract will gain legitimacy of stakeholders 
and is expected to reduce risk (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; in sayekti 2011). 
Prior research by Dufresne, francois and Patrick (2004) found that 
Csr disclosure is associated with decreased business risk and increased 
risk-adjusted performance in the long term. Nguyen, Pascal and Anna (2015) 
found high Csr disclosures related to diversity and employee relations is 
positively associated on stock risk. Mishra and Modi (2002) categorised Csr 
disclosure into positive and negative, and found that positive Csr disclosure 
is associated with decreased stock risk and vice versa. Chakrabarty and 
Bass (2013) found that ethical value, and CSR in microfinance institution 
in developing countries related to decreasing operational risk.  
Handajani et al (2009) found that effective CG mechanisms are 
integrated with corporate action and have important roles in the assurance 
of accountability strategy and implementation of Csr. The implementation 
of Csr initiatives and disclosure practice should be followed by regulation 
and policy in order to avoid opportunistic behaviour. The adoption of IAs-
PsAK 50&55 as well as macroprudential policy in the banking industry 
are expected to be the direction in Csr initiatives and disclosure practice 
that will lead to decreased stock risk.
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Based on the explanation above, the first hypothesis is derived as 
follows:
H1a CSR disclosure has negative effect on stock risk. 
H1b The effectiveness of board commissioner mechanisms has negative effect 
on stock risk. 
H1c The effectiveness of audit committee mechanisms has negative effect on 
stock risk. 
H1d Stock riskwill be lower at post period of mandatory adoption of PSAK 50&55 
and macroprudential policy.
CSr Disclosure, CG Mechanism and Earnings Management 
several reasons behind the companies’ decision to undertake Csr 
initiatives have triggered negative or positive association to earnings 
management such as management compensation contract, increasing stock 
price, gaining social legitimacy and other management’s interest (Baron 
2007; Utama 2008; in Handajani et al. 2008). The negative association 
can be explained by myopia avoidance hypothesis in which management 
has long-term horizon in decision making, focusing not only on current 
profits but also on maintaining long-term stakeholders’ relationships. 
The positive association can be explained by hypothesis of predictable 
earnings and multiple objective and interest (Chih et al. 2008). In this 
case, management tends to manage earnings opportunistically in order 
to maintain the predictability of future profits, after considering multiple 
objectives of the shareholders and stakeholders (Jensen 2001 in Chih et al. 
2008; Handajani et al. 2009). 
shleifer (2004) stated that Csr disclosure is perceived as a tool to 
increase transparency and accountability and reduce number of opportunity 
to manage earnings. In this regard, findings showed that the companies 
with strong commitment to social responsibility do portray less earnings 
management. Other findings showed that more socially responsible firms 
have higher accrual quality and less earnings management, both of which 
have an impact on financial reporting quality (Shen and Chih 2005; Hong 
& Andersen 2011).
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other perspectives stated that Csr can exacerbate the agency problem 
that leads to increasing management incentive to undertake earnings 
management. Several findings showed that there are positive associations 
between Csr disclosure and earnings management (Chih et al. 2008; Prior 
et al. 2008; Handajani et al. 2009). Other findings showed that in order to 
gain the benefit of CSR in improving companies’ values in the long term, 
firms need an integrated CG mechanism for CSR strategy and corporate 
action on CSR initiatives (Chih et al. 2008; Handajani et al., 2009; Lanis 
& richardson 2011). Based on the explanation, the second hyphothesis is 
derived as follows:
H2a CSR disclosure has negative effect on earnings management. 
H2b The effectiveness of the board of commissioners has strengthened the 
negative effect of CSR disclosure on earnings management.
H2c The effectiveness of the audit committtee has strengthened the negative 
effect on CSR disclosure on earnings management.
H2d Earnings management will be lower at post period of mandatory adoption 
of PSAK 50&55 and macroprudential policy 
Earnings Management and Stock risk
Previous research findings showed that earnings management has 
a positive relationship with risk. francis, ryan, olsson and schipper 
(2005) found that the companies with poor accrual quality have higher 
costs of capital than those with good accruals quality. Hong and Andersen 
(2011) stated that the effect of Csr disclosure cannot be separated from 
the credibility of earnings information. Poor accrual quality is a part of 
information risk. 
Prior reseach on market reaction showed that investors tend to misprice 
the quality of accruals (sloan 1996; Xie 2001; richardson et al. 2005). 
In line with these findings, research in the banking industry by Beaver 
& Engel (1996) has found positive association between component of 
accrual descreationary of loan loss provision and market value of common 
equity. Yasuda (2004) found that bank risk is negatively associated with 
discretionary accrual in the banking industry of Japan. This finding indicated 
that investors misperceive high earnings quality as favourable information 
about bank financial health. The negative relationship was very strong in 
years of crisis in the late 1997, and decreased thereafter.
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Assuming banking companies being in a highly regulated industry, 
regulation of Csr disclosure, mandatory adoption of IAs-PsAK 50&55 as 
well as macroprudential policy are expected to contribute in improving the 
quality of accruals and providing true understanding for investors. 
The third hypothesis is derived as follows:
H3a Earnings management has positive effect on stock risk. 
H3b Stock risk will be lower at post period of mandatory adoption of PSAK 
50&55 and macroprudential policy, as consequences of lower earnings 
management.
rESEACH METHOD 
Sample and Data
The population of the study comprised of all the banking companies 
listed on IDX during 2008-2013. The purposive sampling method was used 
for sample selection.  The criteria for sample selection covers a) Banks with 
a minimum of 3 years of listing; b) Availability of the publication of the 
annual report containing Csr disclosure and Corporate Governance; and c) 
Availability of complete financial statements and other supporting financial 
data. The final samples of 131 observations (firm-years) are presented in 
Appendix Table 1.
Table 3.1: Sample Selection
Population Sample
Bank listed at IDX                       2013 36 22
2012 31 22
2011 30 22
2010 29 22
2009 28 22
2008 28 21
Total Selected Sample 182 131 firm-years
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This study used secondary data from annual reports of the banking 
companies published in the IDX website. Annual reports are data sources 
for calculating the index of Csr and CG mechanisms. financial statement 
and Indonesia Capital Market Directory are sources for financial data, 
while the stock price data were collected through Yahoo Finance. review 
of literature was conducted through text book, scientific journals, and other 
related sources.
The data were analysed using balance panel approach and ordinary 
Least square/oLs multiple regression. Additional analysis was conducted 
using Two stage Least square/TsLs for endogenity problem in the model. 
CONCEPTUAL frAMEWOrK AND rESEACH DESIGN
The research model was developed based on the following conceptual 
framework. Three models were developed to test the 3 hypotheses.
- Corporate Social 
  Responsibility
  Disclosure (CSRD)
- Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanism
H2a; H2b; 
H2c; H2d
Earnings 
Management (EM)
H1a; H1b
H1c; H1d 
Stock
Risk
H3a; H3b
figure 1: Conceptual framework
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Three models were developed to examine the hypotheses. Model 1 
was used to test hypothesis 1, as follows:
srIsKit = α0+ α1CsrDit + α2 BCMit+ α3 ACMit + α4DGoVit+ 
α5INsTit
  + α6LN_TAit + α7 PBVit+ α8roEit+ α9DBIG4it + α10 
DPosTt
  + εit  (1)
It was expected that  the coefficient of variables CSRD, BCM, ACM 
and DPOST (α1; α2; ; α3 ;α10) to be negative. This means that increasing level 
of Csr disclosure as well as increasing effectiveness of CG mechanism 
will contribute to decreasing stock risk. The negative coefficient for DPOST 
means that stock risk is predicted to be lower in the post period mandatory 
adoption of PsAK 50&55. 
Model 2 was used to test hypothesis 2, as follows:
EMit = β0+ β1CsrDit + β2BCM + β3ACMit + β4CsrD*BCMit
  + β5  CsrD*ACMit + β6 DGoVit+  β7 INsTit+  β8 LN_TA + 
β9 PBVit +  β10roEit+  β11DBIG4t+ β12 DPosTt   +  εit
(2)
It was expected that the coefficient of variables CSRD, BCM, ACM 
and DPosT (β1; β4; β5 ;β12) to be negative. This means that increasing level 
of Csr disclosure as well as increasing effectiveness of CG mechanism 
as moderating effect will contribute to lower earnings management. The 
negative coefficient for DPosT means that earnings management is 
predicted to be lower in the post period of mandatory adoption of PsAK 
50&55.
Model 3 was used to test hypothesis 3, as follows:
srIsKit = λ0+ λ1CsrDit + λ2EM_EXPit+ λ3BCMit + λ4ACMit+ 
λ5CsrD*BCMit + λ6CsrD*ACMit + λ7DGoVit 
+ λ8DINsTit+ λ9LN_TAit + λ10PBVit + λ11roEitt+  
λ12DBIG4it+  λ13DPosT it+ εit 
(3)
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It was expected that the coefficient variables of earnings management 
EM_EXP (λ2) to be positive. This means that increasing level of earnings 
management will contribute to increasing stock risk. Meanwhile, the 
expectation of coefficient DPOST (λ13) is predicted to be negative. It means 
that lower earnings management in the post period of mandatory adoption 
of PsAK 50&55 will contribute to lower stock risk. The variables are 
explained as follows:
Independent and/or Dependent Variable
CSRD
it
CSR Disclosure index by Lanis & Richardson, (2011)
EM
it 
Earnings management as absolute value of descreationary provision 
for loan losses for bank and financial services by Beaver dan Engel 
(1996), 
SRISK
it
Variability in monthly stock price for 12 month since 1 January 2008. 
BCM
it
Index of Board of Commisioners mechanism effectiveness by 
Hermawan (2009)
ACM
it
Index of Audit Committee mechanism effectiveness by Hermawan 
(2009)
EM_EXP
it
Natural Logarithm of expected earnings management (fitted value) 
by Beaver dan Engel (1996).
DPOST
it
Dummy variable 1 for post period adoption of  PSAK 50&55 (2011-
2013), 0 otherwise (2008-2010)
Control Variables
DGOV
it
Dummy variable 1 for banking companies with government ownership, 
and 0 otherwise
DINST
it
Dummy variable 1 for banking companies with institutional ownership, 
and 0 otherwise
LN_TA
it
Proxy size of the companies measured as natural logarithm of total 
asset. 
ROE
it
Proxy of profitability measured as  ratio net income per book value 
equity
DBIG4
it
Proxy of external monitoring measured as dummy variable 1, if the 
banking companies using one of the Big4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
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Operationalisation of Variables
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD)
Csr disclosure is measured as a checklist that consists of 52 items 
developed by Lanis and richardson, (2011). The checklist consists of 6 
groups of topics namely: 1) Csr and strategy items; 2) staff strategy items; 
3) social investment items; 4) Environment items; 5) Customer and supplier 
items; and 6) Community and political involvement items. The checklist is 
then evaluated using content analysis with dichotomous approach, where if 
each Csr items disclosed is given the value 1, and 0 if it is not disclosed. 
Next, each item is summed to obtain the overall value to calculate the Csr 
disclosure index according to the formula as follows:
CSRD j =  Σ Xij / nj
Where:
CSRD j: Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Index for 
company j
Nj:  Total item for company j, nj <= 52
X ij : Content analysis; 1=if item is disclosed; 0=if item I is not 
disclosed.
so that, 0 <= CsrD <= 1.
Additional tests are conducted on Csr disclosure using sustainability 
report (sr) based on GrI. In this regard, Csr disclosure is measured by 
dummy variable 1 for banking company that reports sr, and 0 otherwise. 
This testing is conducted as not all listed banking companies report on Csr 
in the Sustainability Report. The testing aims to find out whether it produces 
a consistent result with the proxy of Csr disclosure index.
Stock risk (SrISK)
stock risk is measured using the standard deviation of monthly stock 
price for 12 months from 1 January 2008.  standard deviation of monthly 
stock price can be used as a proxy to the absolute value of the stock price 
expectations (Hartono, 2013; Puspitarini, 2014). This study did not use 
beta from CAPM due to data availability. standard deviation is calculated 
as follows
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Where:
Xi: stock return monthi
X: Average value of stock at 
research period. 
N: Number of observation
Earnings Management (EM)
Earnings management in this study is measured using descreationary 
accrual portion of loan losses for banking and financial services as used by 
Beaver and Engel, (1996) as follows:
N_ALL
 it
 =  α
0
 + α
1
CO
itt
 + α
2 LOANit+ α3NPAit+ α4 γ∆NPAit+1 +  εit
ALL it =  N_ALLitt+ D_ALLitt
ALL it =  α0 + α1COitt + α2 LOANit+ α3NPAit+ α4 γ∆NPAit+1 +  zit z
it
=  D_ALL
it
+  µ
it
Where:
CO it Loan charge offs 
LOAN
 it
loans outstanding 
NPA
 it
non performing assets. 
ΔNPA
 it+1
One period ahead change in nonperforming assets 
N_ALL it Estimated nondescreationary portion of the allowance 
for loan losses
ALL
 it
Total allowance for loan losses.
z
it
Residual value as accrual descreationary
Corporate Governance Mechanism Effectiveness
This study measures CG mechanisms through content analysis to obtain 
an index CG mechanisms effectiveness. CG mechanisms effectiveness is 
measured through a proxy of board of commissioners (BCM) and audit 
committee (ACM) in accordance with CG mechanism checklist published 
by Hermawan, (2009). scoring method for CG disclosure items are based 
on quality of disclosure, whereby the score 3 indicates (good), 2 for (fair) 
and 1 for (poor) disclosure.
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The effectiveness of the board of commissioners (BCM) is measured 
by 17 items, namely a) independence - 6 items; b) Activities - 6 items; c) 
The size of commissioners - one item; and d) skills and competencies - 4 
items. The effectiveness of the audit committee (ACM) is measured by 
11 items, namely a) Activity - 8 items; b) size - 1 item; c) skills; and d) 
Competencies - 2 items. Next, each item is summed to obtain the overall 
value for the CG mechanism effectiveness index.  
Control Variables 
This study uses several control variables. They are ownership structure, 
the financial characteristics of the company as well as audit quality as 
external monitoring mechanisms, all of which are found to have significant 
effects in prior research finding (Handajani et al. 2009; Hong and Andersen 
2011, and sayekti 2011).
Characteristics of ownership structure include: government ownership 
and institutional ownership. The financial characteristics of the company 
include: the size of the company, growth and profitability. Audit quality as 
a measure of external monitoring mechanism is proxied by auditor from 
Big 4 auditing firms. The adoption of SFAS 50&55 and macroprudential 
policy are controlled by dummy variable for post period of adoption from 
2011-2013. 
rESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistic results are presented in Table 2 as follows:
Table 2: Descriptive Statistic
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Obs
SRISK 0.114 0.096 0.096 0.000 0.072 131
EM 0.616 0.379 4.817 0.007 0.754 131
EM_EXP 2.533 2.573 2.828 2.095 0.189 131
CSRD 0.498 0.444 0.822 2.095 0.189 131
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BCM 0.786 0.444 0.822 0.267 0.141 131
ACM 0.786 0.765 0.980 0.471 0.099 131
LN_TA 15.685 17.049 20.413 10.301 5.384 131
PBV 3.205 1.670 18.452 -1.740 4.404 131
ROE 1.077 1.170 3.730 -9.460 1.652 131
DGOV 0.323 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.448 131
DINST 0.710 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.456 131
DPOST 0.520 0.275 1.000 0.000 0.483 131
DBIG4 0.710 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.524 131
Sources Eviews 8
Based on the maximum, minimum and average values, the Csr 
disclosure index (CsrD) ranges between 0.267-0.822, with the average 
of 0.498. The results show that Csr disclosure in the banking industry 
in Indonesia is quite low; it is below 60%.  The range of Board of 
Commisioners effectiveness index (BCM) is 0.471-0.980, with an average 
of 0.786. Meanwhile, the range of Audit Committee effectiveness index 
(ACM) is 0.364-0.970 with an average of 0766. The results show that CG 
mechanism is adequate as the value  is bigger than 75%.
Classical Test Assumption 
Classical test assumption is performed to meet the normality 
assumption as stated in Table.3. Normality test shows that the distribution of 
the data is approximately normal as evidenced by the bell-shaped pattern of 
the histogram and coefficient of Jarque-Berra. The probability for all models 
is proven to be more than 0.05. This result shows that the data used in the 
models of the study is normally distributed. Pearson-Correlation test shows 
that there is no significant correlation among variables. Multicolinearity test 
shows that the Variance Inflation Factor/VIF has a value below 10 for all 
models. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no multicolinearity problems 
among the independent variables within the model. The models also pass the 
LM-test and White-test, for autocorrelation and heterokedasticity in the data. 
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Table 3: Classical Test Assumption
Model Normality Autocorrelation-LM Test Heterokedastity - White Multicolinearity
Jarque-
Berra
Prob Durbin-
Watson
F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob VIF
Model 1
CG,CSR  
SRISK
1.757 0,4154 1.9766 0.0545 0.9998 1.1286 0.3113 VIF <5
Model 2
CG,CSREM 1.1190 0.6102 1.9653 0.1845 0.9988 1.2966 0.1478 VIF < 10
Model 3
CG, CSR,EM_
EXP S
RISK
2.945 0.4563 2.0220 0.1059 0.9999 1.0175 0.423 VIF < 5
Sources: Eviews 8, SPSS
Correlation Test
The results of correlation test are presented in Tabel 4. The 
correlations among the variables are less than 0.8. It indicates that there 
is no potential multicollinearity problem with the data.  The correlations 
between Csr disclosure and stock risk (srIsK), and Csr disclosure and 
earning management (EM) show negative values of (-0.132) and (-0.028), 
respectively; the sign is as predicted. The correlations between board of 
commissioner mechanism (BCM) and stock risk (srIsK), and BCM and 
earning management (EM) also show negative values of (-0.096) and 
(-0.019), respectively. The correlation between audit committee mechanism 
(ACM) and stock risk (srIsK) shows a positive value of (0.038), which 
contradicts with the prediction. Lastly, the correlation between ACM and 
earnings management (EM) shows a negative value of (-0.019). 
regression result
The regression of the model is presented in Table 5 in the appendix. The 
f-Test results indicate the effect of independent variables on the dependent 
variable in each model. The adjusted R-squared for the models 18.7%, 
31.4% and 11.9%, respectively, with the probability of F-stat is significant 
at 1% for all models. It can be deduced that the independent variables in 
all models can explain the dependent variable.
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Table 5: Regression Result
Exp
Sign
Model 1
CG, CSrSrISK
Model 2
CG, CSrEM
Model 3
CSr,EM_
EXPSrISK 
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept 0.281 0.004 ** 2.670 0.015 ** 0.689 0.004 ***
CSRD - -0.020 0.093 * -0.403 0.084 ** -0.034 0.098 *
BCM - 0.117 0.102 * 1,546 0.104 * 0.094 0.135
ACM - -0.016 0.047 ** -0.751 0.032 ** -0.094 0.048 **
DPOST - -0.045 0.007 *** 0.132 0.230 -0.041 0.001 ***
CSRD*BCM - 0.648 0.072 * 0.608 0.075 *
CSRD*ACM - -0.193 0.025 ** -0.198 0.284
EM_EXP + 0.014 0.046 **
DGOV - -0.025 0.173 -0.195 0.140 -0.024 0.180
DINST - -0.049 0.045 ** -0.234 0.110 -0.045 0.053 **
DBIG4 0.014 0.194 -0.450 0.005 *** 0.020 0.113
LN_TA + -0.001 0.280 -0.034 0.097 -0.003 0.435
PBV - -0.030 0.442 -0.032 0.156 0.002 0.451
ROE - -0.002 0.303 -0.073 0.025 ** -0.001 0.356
Adjusted 
R-squares
0.187 0.314 0.119
F-Stat 2.66 5.503 2.363
Prob 
(F-Stat)
0.006 *** 0.000 *** 0.007 ***
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
SRISK: Standard deviation or variability of monthly stock price. EM: Earnings Management - 
Absolute Discreationary Accrual for Loan loss provision (Beaver and Engel, 1996); EM_EXP: 
Fitted Value / Expected Earnings Management; CSRD: CSR disclosure index; BCM: The 
Effectiveness of Board of Commisioner (Hermawan, 2009); ACM: The effectiveness of Audit 
Committee (Hermawan, 2009); DGOV: Dummy 1 for Government Ownership, 0 otherwise; 
DINST; Dummy 1 for institutional Ownership,  0 otherwise; DBIG4; Dummy 1 for BIG4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise; LN_TA: Natural logarithm of Total Assets; PBV: Price to Book 
Value (Growth); ROE: Return on Equity (Proxy for profitability; DPOST; Dummy 1 for the 
period after the regulation (2011-2013), and 0 for the  period (2008-2011).
Sources: Eviews 8
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Table 6: Additional Test
Exp 
Sign
Additional Test
CG,CSrD EM
Exp 
Sign
Additional Test
CG,CSrD,EM_
Exprisk
Endogenity Test
CG,CSrD,EM_
Exprisk
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept 2.670 0.015 *** 0.689 0.004 *** 0.689 0.004 ***
DUM_SR - -0.403 0.043 ** - -0.034 0.098 * -0.039 0.098 *
BCM - 1,546 0.104 * - 0.094 0.135 0.094 0.135
BCM_
ACTIV
- 0.507 0.104 - 0.098 0.102 0.813 0.085
BCM_
INDEP
- -0.453 0.097 * - -0.172 0.083 * -0.103 0.065 *
BCM_
SIZE
+ 0.354 0.101 + 0.056 0.354 0.365 0.323
ACM - -0.751 0.032 ** - -0.094 0.048 ** 0.094 0.048 **
DPOST - 0.049 0.364 - -0.042 0.002 *** -0.045 0.006 ***
EM_EXP + + -0.018 0.445 -0.886 0.138
DGOV + -0.195 0.140 + -0.024 0.180 -0.024 0.180
DINST - -0.234 0.110 - -0.045 0.053 ** -0.045 0.053 **
DBIG4 - -0.450 0.005*** - 0.020 0.113 0.020 0.113
LN_TA + -0.034 0.097* + -0.003 0.435 -0.003 0.435
PBV - -0.032 0.156 - 0.002 0.451 0.002 0.451
ROE - -0.073 0.025** - -0.001 0.356 -0.001 0.356
Adjusted 
R-squares
0.314 0.191 0.207
F-Stat 5.503 2.122 2.365
Prob 
(F-Stat)
0.000 *** 0.017 *** 0.000 ***
Instrumen Variabel for Endogenity Test :
CSRD, BCM, ACM, CSR*BCM, CSR*ACM, DGOV, DINST, DBIG4, LN_TA, PBV, ROE, 
,DPOST
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10.
SRISK: Standard deviation or variability of monthly stock price. EM: Earnings Management 
- Absolute Descreationary Accrual for Loan loss provision (Beaver and Engel, 1996); 
EM_EXP: Fitted Value / Expected Earnings Management; DUM_SR: CSR  disclosure in 
Dummy 1 if using Sustainability Report, 0 otherwise; BCM: The Effectiveness of Board of 
Commisioner (Hermawan, 2009); ACM: The effectiveness of Audit Committee (Hermawan, 
2009); DGOV: Dummy 1 for Government Ownership, 0 otherwise; DINST; Dummy 1 for 
institutional Ownership,  0 otherwise; DBIG4; Dummy 1 for BIG4 auditors, and 0 otherwise; 
LN_TA: Natural logarithm of Total Assets; PBV: Price to Book Value (Growth); ROE: Return 
on Equity (Proxy for profitability; DPOST; Dummy 1 for the period after the regulation (2011-
2013), and 0 for the  period (2008-2011).
Model 1 is used to examine hypothesis 1, which stated that Csr 
disclosure and CG mechanism have negative effects on stock risk. The T-Test 
result shows that CSR disclosure negatively affects stock risk, significant at 
10%. This finding is in line with the prediction, thus, H1a is accepted. The 
board of commissioner mechanism positively affects stock risk, significant 
at 10%, but the sign is opposite to the prediction. Hence, H1b is rejected. 
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The audit committee mechanism negatively affects stock risk, significant 
at 5%. This finding is in line with the prediction, hence, H1c is accepted. 
The results show negative coefficient for post period (DPOST), significant 
at 1%. This implies that the stock risk is lower at post period of mandatory 
adoption of PSAK 50&55. This finding is in line with prediction, thus H1d 
is accepted.
The evidences show weak effect of Csr disclosure in reducing stock 
risk (significant at 10%). This weak effect occurs in situations where the 
CG mechanisms show partial effect on stock risk, with the role of board 
of commissioner mechanism is less effective. Nevertheless, the evidence 
shows the stock risk is lower in post period of mandatory adoption of PsAK 
50&55 (revised 2006) and related macroprudential policy.
Model 2 is used to examine hyphothesis 2 that states that Csr 
disclosure and CG mechanisms are affecting earnings management 
negatively. The T-test result for model 2 shows that Csr disclosure 
negatively affects earnings management, significant at 10%. This finding 
is in line with the prediction, thus H2a is accepted. The interaction between 
Csr disclosure and board of commissioner mechanisms (CsrD*BCM) 
positively affects earnings management, significant at 10 %, but the sign 
is opposite to the initial prediction. Thus, H2b is rejected. The interaction 
between Csr disclosure and audit committee mechanisms (CsrD*ACM) 
has negatively affected earnings management, significant at 5%. This 
finding is in line to the prediction, thus, H2c is accepted. The results show 
that there is no significant difference in earnings management in the prior 
period compared to the post period of mandatory adoption of PsAK 50&55, 
as predicted. Therefore, H1d is rejected.
The evidences show that the effect of Csr disclosure in reducing 
earnings management is quite weak. There are partial effects of corporate 
governance mechanism in reducing earnings management. The insignificant 
moderating effect of board of commissioner seems to be compensated by 
strong effect of audit committee mechanisms. However, the existence of 
partial role of corporate governance is supposed to cause no significant 
decrease in earnings management, hence, there is no significant differences 
in earnings management in periods prior to and post mandatory adoption 
of PsAK 50&55 and related macroprudential policy. 
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Model 3 is used to examine hyphothesis 3 that states that earnings 
management positively affects stock risk. The T-Test result for model 
3 shows consistent result for the effects of Csr disclosure and CG 
mechanisms on stock risk. Csr disclosure is affecting stock risk, and the 
effect of interaction between CG mechanisms and stock risk is found to be 
partial. The evidence shows that earnings management (fitted value of EM) 
is found to be positively affecting stock risk, significant at 5%.Thus, H3a is 
accepted. overall, it can be concluded that showstock risk is lower in post 
period of mandatory adoption of PsAK 50&55 as predicted. 
The evidence suggests that earnings management reflects accrual 
quality; higher earnings management reflects poor accrual quality and 
related to information risk. This study supports those studies by Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2004 and francis et al. 2005. The evidence of lower risk post 
period of PSAK 50&55, reflects that the market responds to the information 
of accrual properly; this finding is in line with Francis, (2005) but dissimilar 
to those of Beaver and Engel, (1996) as well as sloan, (1996), Xie, (2001); 
richardson et al. (200) and subramanyam, 2007).
The T-Test result for Control Variables for all models can be concluded 
for the effect of ownership structure (DGoV and DINsT), financial 
characteristic (Size, Profitability and Growth) and audit quality (DBIG4). 
The evidences show insignificant lower earnings management and stock risk 
at banks with goverment ownership, but significantly lower stock risk for 
banks with institutional ownership. The size and growth of companies have 
no significant effect on earnings management and stock risk. Profitability 
has a negative effect on earnings management, but does not affect stock 
risk.The banks that are audited by Big4 auditors are found to have lower 
earnings management, although it has no effect on stock risk.
Additional Test
Additional testing is done with consideration of several things; 1) To 
use dummy variable for banks that disclosed Csr using Global reporting 
Initiative/GRI in Sustainability Reporting, 2) To explore the findings of 
the ineffective role of board of commissioner mechanisms (BCM), by 
decomposing board of commissioner mechanism into activity, independence 
and size of BCM; and 3) To address the issue of endogenity in the model 
of the study, using Two stage Least square/TsLs.
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The result of additional test is presented in Table.6. It shows a 
consistent result in terms of the negative effect Csr disclosure (CsrD) 
has on earnings management and stock risk. The evidence shows there are 
significant lower earnings management as well as lower stock risk for banks 
that disclosed Csr in sustainability report (DUM_sr). The evidences 
show that the ineffective board of commissioners’ mechanism is caused by 
ineffectiveness in the activity and size of BCM. The result shows only the 
independence of the board has a significant effect on earnings management 
and stock risk. This result suggests that the ineffective size of the board 
contributes to communication problem among members in directing the 
banks’ activities and executing their monitoring function. The endogenity 
test of the model is done using two stage least square /TsLs, with related 
instrument variable: CsrD, BCM, ACM, Csr*BCM, Csr*ACM, DGoV, 
DINsT, DBIG4, LN_TA, PBV, roE, DPosT. The result shows consistent 
and significant explanation of independent to dependent variable in the 
model of the study (Adjusted R-square 20.7% significant at 1%). 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION AND SUGGESTION
This study aimed to investigate the effects of Csr disclosure and CG 
mechanisms on earnings management and stock risk in the banking industry 
of Indonesia. The study also aimed to explain whether the effect of Csr 
disclosure on stock risk is mediated by the effect on earnings management. 
The study is conducted from the context of mandatory adoption of PsAK 
50&55 (revised 2006) and macroprudential policy in 2010, and performed 
on 131 bank-years samples companies listed on IDX during the period 
from 2008 to 2013.The result of this study has added empirical evidence 
regarding the effect of Csr disclosure on stock risk in the banking industry 
in Indonesia. 
The result of the study shows there is a weak, direct and negative 
effect of CSR disclosure on stock risk (significant at 10%). The evidence 
shows partial effect of CG mechanisms on stock risk. The role of board 
of commissioner mechanisms as proxy of CG mechanisms is found to 
be less effective, while the audit committee mechanisms are found to be 
negatively affecting stock risk. However, overall, the evidence shows that 
stock risk is lower in post period of mandatory adoption of PsAK 50&55 
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(Revised 2006) and related macroprudential policy. This findings support 
prior research by Mendelson (1986) and Diamond and Verrecchia, (1991), 
which similarly concluded that voluntary disclosure has negative effect on 
bid ask spread as proxy of risk. 
The effect of CSR disclosure on stock risk is significantly explained by 
mediation of earnings management. The result shows that Csr disclosure 
has a significant negative effect on earnings management, which is consistent 
with (Hong and Andersen 2011), and earnings management has a significant 
positive effect on stock risk, which is consistent with Bebbington et al. 
(2008) and shen and Chih (2008). This result supports the argument that 
accrual quality reflects information risk (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2004 and francis et al., 2005). Csr disclosure is proved 
to be negatively affecting earnings management and  stock risk, hence, it 
can be concluded that the result also supports the argument of Bebbington 
et al. (2008), in which it stated that companies undertake Csr disclosure 
as part of their reputational risk management. 
It is also found that the effectiveness of CG mechanisms plays an 
important role in determining the effect of Csr disclosure on earnings 
management and stock risk. This result supports prior reseach (Chih et al 
2008; Handajani et al. 2009). The result suggests that ineffective activity 
and size of board of commissioner contribute to ineffective communication 
among the members of the board in directing and monitoring the banks. 
The result of the study supports the claim that the effect of Csr disclosure 
on earnings management should be supported by related regulation and 
policy. The mandatory adoption of PsAK 50&55 (revised 2016) and related 
macroprudential policy is proven to complement the Csr disclosure practice 
in the banking industry in Indonesia.
This study has several implications for regulators. The low level of 
Csr disclosure in the banking industry, especially for the banks listed on 
IDX needs to be a concern for regulators in assessing the effectiveness of 
related standard, regulation and policies in banking industries. A strong 
impetus is needed to encourage the effective CG mechanisms in Csr 
disclosure practice.
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This study has several limitations that can be used as consideration 
for future research such as a) potential bias in calculating the index of Csr 
disclosure and CG mechanisms index, due to the subjective nature of content 
analysis; and b) this study is using relatively short time period of data. It 
is suggested that future research focuses on measuring Csr disclosure 
using the sustainability report based on the checklist of Global reporting 
Initiative/GrI and extends the observation period.
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